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ESSAYS

O N T H E

, INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN,

By THOMAS REID, D. D. F. R. S. E.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW*

Who hath put luifdom in the innuard parts ? Jo b.

VOL. L

DUBLIN:

Printed for L. W H I T E, No. 86, Dami-Strk

M,DCC,1.XXXVI,

T O

Mr. DUGALD STEWART,

LATELY

PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS,

N O W

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY,

AND

Dr. JAMES GREGORY,

PROFESSOR OF THE THEORY OF PHYSIC. In the Univerfity of Edinburgh.

My dear Friends,

IK N O W not to whom I can addrefs thefe EfTays with more propriety than to You ; not only on account of a friendfhip begun in early life on your part, though in old age on mine, and in one of you I may fay hereditary ; nor yet on account of that correfpondence in our lite- rary purfuits and amufements, which has always given me fo great pleafure ; but becaufe, if thefe EfTays have any merit, you have a con- fiderable fhare in it, having not only encouraged me to hope that they may be ufeful, but fa- voured me with your obfervations on every part of them, both before they were fent to the Prefs and while they were under it.

A 2 I have

IV

DEDICATION.

I have availed myfelf of your obfervations, fo as to correct many faujts that might other- v^rife have efcaped me;*-and I- have a very grate- ful fenfc of your friendfhip, in giving this aid to one, who flood much in need of it : having no fliame, but mucH pleafure, in being: inftr'ud- ed by thofe who formerly were my pupils, as one of you was.

It would be ingratitude to a man whofe me- mory I moft highly refped, not to mention my obligations to the late Lord Kames for the con- cern he was pleafed to take in this Work. Having feen a fmall part of it, he urged me to carry it on ; took account of my progrefs from time to time ; revifed it more than once, as far as it was carried, before his death ; and gave me his obfervations on it, both witli refpedt to the matter and the expreffion. On fome points we differed in opinion, and debated them keen- ly, both in converfation and by many letters, without any abatement of his affedion, or of his zeal for the Work's being carried on and publifhcd : For he had too much liberality of mind not to allow to others the fame liberty in judging which he claimed to liimfelf.

It is difficult to fay whether that worthy man was more eminent in adive life or in fpecula- tion. Very rare, furcly, have been the inftan- ces where the talents for both were united in fo eminent a degree.

His

DEDICATION.

V

His genius and induftry, in many different branches of literature, will, by his works, be known .to pofterity : His private virtues, and public fpirit, his afllduity, through a long and laborious life, ih many honourable public offi- ces with which he was entrufted, and his zeal to encourage and promote every thing that tended to the improvement of his country in laws, literature, commerce, manufactures and agriculture, are beft known to his friends and cotemporaries.

The favourable opinion which He, and You my Friends, were pleafed to exprefs of this Work, has been my chief encouragement to lay it before the Public ; and perhaps, without that encouragement, it had never feen the light : For I have always found, that, without focial intercourfe, even a favourite fpeculation languifhesj and that we cannot help thinking the better of our own opinions when they are approved by thofe whom we efteem good judges.

You know that the fubflance of thefe Eflays Was delivered annually, for more than twenty years, in Lectures to a large body of the more advanced ftudents in this Univerfity, and for feveral years before, in another Univerfity. Thofe who heard me with attention, of whom I prefume there are fome hundreds alive, will recognife the do<^rine which they heard, fome of them thirty years ago, delivered to them

more

vi DEDICATION,

more difFiifely, and with the repetitions and illuftrations proper for fuch audiences.

I am afraid, indeed, that the more intelli- gent reader, who is converfant in fuch abftradl fubje(£ls, may think that there are repetitions flill left, which might be fpared. Such, il hope, will confider, that what to one reader s a fuperfluous repetition, to the greater part, lefs converfant in fuch fubjeds, may be very ufeful. If this apology be deemed infufficient, and be thought to be the didate of lazinefs, I claim fome indulgence even for that lazinefs, at my period of life.

You who are in the prime of life, with the vigour which it infpires, will, I hope, make more happy advances in this or in any other branch of fcience to which your talents may be ap- plied.

Glasgow-Co l l e g e, line I. 1785.

T H O. R E I D.

CONTENTS.

vn

CONTENTS.

V O L. I.

Page

PREFACE, — ix

ESSAY I. PRELIMINARY.

Ch a f . I . Explication of tuorJs^ — — I '

■ 2, Principles taken for grant et/^ -mm jj • 3- Ofhypothefis, — — 45

4. Of analegy, — — 53

I 5. Of the proper means of kntnving the operations

of the viind, — — 58 — 6, Of the difficulty of attending to the operations

of our oivn minds y — 64

■ !■ 7. Di'vifionofthepoiversofthemindy — yi

'■ 8. Of facial operations of mind, — 77

ESSAY II. OF THE POWERS WE HAVE BY MEANS OF OUR EXTERNAL SENSES.

Chap, i. Of the organs of fenfe, — 81

2. Of the imprefftens on the organs, ner<ueSy and

brain, — — 86

. ■ 3: Hypothefts concerning the nerves and brain, 9©

4. Falfe conch f ions draiun from the imprefftons

before mentioned, — — 1 06

..I » 5. Of perception, — — 119

■ 6. What it is to account for a phenomenon in l^a-

ture, — — I Z 8

■ 7. Sentiments of Philofophers about the perception

of external objeds ; and, frjl. Of the

theoryof FatherMAi.EBKA'KCHE, 132

■ 8. Of the common theory of perception, and of the

fentiments of the Peripatetics, and of Des

Cartes, — — I44

I 9. Of the fentiments of Mr. LocK'E, 167

10. Of the fentiments of Bijhop Berkeley, 183

— — 1 1 . Ei/hop Berkbi-ey's fentiments of the nature

of ideas, —' — 205

Cha?,

^

vili CONTENTS.

Page

Chap. 12. Of lAe fentiments of Mr. Hvmz, 220

• 13. Of the fentimenls of Aktoky ARJiWLDf ZzS

14. Reflexions on the common theory of ideas^ 234

i<^.' ylccountofthefyjlem of]_.Y.imnz, 259

• 16. Of fenfation, — — 269

17. Of the ohjsds of perception i nnd^ firfl^ Of

primary and fecondary qualities, 280

• ■» I 8. Of other objeBs of perception^ — . 296 ' 19. Of matter and fpace, — 306 ■ 20. Of the evidence of fenfe, and of belief in ge- neral, — • — . 319

— — 21. Of the intproTDemtnt of the fenfesy ^■^\.

• 22. Of the fallacy of the fenfesy — 343

ESSAY III. OF MEMORY.

Chap, i. Things cbz'ious and certain ivith regard to

memory, — — 361

— — 2. Metnory an original faculty, — 365

■ 3. Of duration, — — 370

4. Of identity, — — 375

. 5. Mr. hocKh's account of the origin of our

ideas, and particularly of the idea of dura- tion, — ' «— 383

— — 6. Of Mr. Locke's account of our perfonal

identity, — — 395

» 7. Theories concerning memory, — 402

[k]

PREFACE.

HUMAN knowledge may be reduced to two general heads, according as it relates to body, or to mind j to things material, or to things intelledual.

The whole fyftem of bodies in the Univerfe, of which we know but a very fmall part, may' be called the Material World ; the whole fyf- tem of minds, from the infinite Creator to the meanefl creature endowed with thought, may be called the Intelledual World. Thefe are the two great kingdoms of nature that fall with- in our notice ; and about the one, or the other, or things pertaining to them, every art, every fcience, and every human thought is employed ; nor can the boldefl flight of imagination carry us beyond their limits.

Many things there are indeed regarding the nature and the ftrudure both of body and of mind, which our faculties cannot reach ; many difficulties which the ablefl: Philofopher cannot refolve ; but of other natures, if any other there be, we have no knowledge, no conception at all.

That

PREFACE.

That every thing that exifls muft be either corporeal or incorporeal, is evident. But it is not fo evident, that evefy thing that exifts muft be either corporeal, or endowed with thought. Whether there be in the Univerfe, beings, which are neither extended, folid and inert, like body, nor adive and intelligent, like mind, feems to be beyond the reach of our knowledge. There appears to be a vaft interval between body and mind, and whether there be any intermediatenat urethat connects them together, we know not.

We have no reafon to afcribe intelligence, or even fenlation, to plants ; yet there appears in them an aftive force and energy, which cannot be the refult of any arrangement or combination of inert matter. The fame thing jnay be faid of thofe powers by which animals are nourifhed and grow, by which matter gra- vitates, by which magnetical and elcdrical bodies attradt and repel each other, and by which the parts of folid bodies cohere.

Some have conjedured that the phasnomena of the material world which require adive force, arc produced by the continual operation of intelligent beings : Others have conjectured, that there may be in the Univerfe, beings that are aftive without intelligence, which, as a kind of incorporeal machinery, contrived by the fupreme Wifdom, perform their deftined talk without any knowledge or intention. But^ laying afide conjecture, and all pretences to determine in things beyond our reach, we muft reft in this, that body and mind are the only kinds of being of which we can have any know- ledge,

PREFACE. xi

ledge, or can form any conception. If there are other kinds, they are not difcoverable by the faculties which God hath given us ; and, with regard to us, are as if they were not.

As therefore all our knowledge is confined to body and mind, or things belonging to them, there are two great branches of philofo- phy, one relating to body, the other to mind. The properties of body, and the laws that ob- tain in the material fyftem, are the objedls of* natural philofophy, as that word is now ufed. The branch which treats of the nature and ope- rations of minds, has by fome been called Pneumatology. And to the one or the othef of thefe branches, the principles of all the fciences belong.

What variety there may be of minds or thinking beings throughout this vafl; Univerfe, we cannot pretend to fay. We dwell in a Httle corner of God's dominion, disjoined from the reft of it. The globe which we inhabit is but one of feven planets that encircle our fun. What various orders of beings may inhabit the other fix, their fecondaries, and the comets belonging to our fyftem ; and how many other funs may be encircled with like fyftems, arc things altogether hid from us. Although hu- man reafon and induftry have difcovered with great accuracy the order and diftances of the planets, and the laws of their motion, we have no means of correfponding with them. That they may be the habitation of animated beings is very probable ; but of the nature, or pow- ers of their inhabitants, we are perfe6tly igno- rant. Every man is confcious of a thinking

principle

Xll

PREFACE.

principle or mind in himfelf, and we have fuffi- cient evidence of a like principle in other men. The aclions of brute animals fhow that they have fome thinking principle, though of a na- ture far inferior to the hunian mind. And every thing about us may convince us of the exillence of a fupreme mind, the Maker and Governor of the Univerfe. Thefe are all the minds of which reafon can give us any cer- tain knowledge.

The mind of man is the nobleft work of God which reafon difcovers to us, and there- fore, on account of its dignity, deferves our fludy. It muft indeed be acknowledged, that although it is of all objects the neareft to us, and feems the moft within our reach, it is very difficult to attend to its operations fo as to form a diftinft notion of them ; and on that account there is no branch of knowledge in which the ingenious and fpeculative have fallen into fo great errors, and even abfurdities. Thefe er- rors and abfurdities have given rife to a gene- ral prejudice againfi: all enquiries of this nature. Becaufe, ingenious men have, for many ages, given different and contradictory accounts of the powers of the mind, it is concluded, that all fpeculations concerning them are chimerical and vifionary.

But whatever cffed this prejudice may have with fupcrficial thinkers, the judicious will not bc^ apt to be carried away with it. About two hundred years ago, the opinions of men in na- tural philofophy were as various, and as con- tradidory, as they are now concerning the powers of the mind. Galileo, ToRRicr.LLi, Kepler, Bacon, and Newton, had the fame difcouragcinent in their attempts to throw light

upon

PREFACE. xiii

upon, the material fyftem, as we have with re- gard to the intelk£lual. If they had been de- terred by fuch prejudices, we fliould never have reaped the benefit of their difcoveries, which do honour to human nature, and will make their, names immortal. The motto which Lord Bacon prefixed to fome of his writings was worthy of his genius, Inveniam 'uiam aut facianu

There is a natural order in the progrefs of the fciences, and good reafons may be afligned why the philofophy of body fhould be elder ftjler to that of mind, and of a quicker growth ; but the lafl hath the principles of life no lefs; than the firft, and will grow up, though flowly, to maturity. The remains of ancient philofo- phy upon this fubjeft, are venerable ruins, carrying the marks of genius and induflry, fufiicient to inflame, but not to fatisfy, our curiofity. In later ages, Des Cartes' was the firft that pointed out the road we ought to take in thofe dark regions. Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, Berkeley, Buffier, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, Price, Lord Kames, have laboured to make difcoveries ; nor have they laboured in vain. For, however different and contrary their conclufions are, however fceptical fome of them, they have all given new light, and cleared the way to thofe who fhall come after them.

We ought never to defpair of human genius, but rather to hope, that, in time, it may pro- duce a fyftem of the powers and operations of the human mind, no lefs certain than thofe of optics or aftronomy.

This

atrr F R E F A C jE.

This IS the more devoutly to be wiflied, that a diftinft knowledge of the powers of the mind ■would undoubtedly give great light to many other branches of fciencc. Mr. Hume hath juflly obferved, that " all the faiences have a *' relation to human nature ; and, however " wide any of them may feem to run from it, " they ftill return back by one paifage or ano- •' ther. This is the centre and capital of the " Cciences, which being once mailers of, we •' may eafily extend our conquefbs every *^ where."

The faculties of our minds are the tools and engines we mufl ufe in every difquifition ; and the better we underfland their nature and force, the more fuccefsfully we fhall be able to apply them. Mr. Locke gives this account of the occafion of his entering upon his Eifay concerning human underilanding : " Five or fix friends (fays he) meeting at my *' chamber, and difcourfmg on a fubjed: very '* remote from this, found themfelves quickly *' at a fland, by the difficulties that rofe on " every fide. After we had for a while puz- *' zled ourfelves, without coming any nearer *^ to a refolution of thofe doubts that perplexed *' us, it came into my thoughts that we took *' a wrong courfe; and that, before we fet *' ourfelves upon enquiries of that nature, it *' was necelTary to examine our own abilities, *' and fee what objefts our underftandings " were fitted or not fitted to deal with. This " 1 propofed to the company, who all readily *' aiTented ; and thereupon it was agreed that " this ihould he our firfl Enquiry.'* If this be commonly the caufe of perplexity in thofe

difqui-

PREFACE. XV

difquifitions which have leaft relation to the mind, it muft be fo much more in thofe that have an immediate connection with it.

The fciences may be diftinguiflied into two

clafles, according as they pertain to the material

or to the intelledtual world. The various parts

of Natural Philofophy, the mechanical Arts,

Chemiftry, Medicine, and Agriculture, belong

to the firft ; but, to the laft, belong Grammar,

Logic, Rhetoric, Natural Theology; Morals,

Jurifprudence, Law, Politics, and the fine

Arts. The knowledge of the human mind is

the root from which thefe grow, and draw their

nourilhment. Whether therefore we confider

the dignity of tK'>» lubjed, or its fubferviency to

fcience in j5«:^neral, and to the nobleft branches

of fcie^^^ ^^ particular, it highly deferves to be

^.p-uvated.

A very elegant writer, on the fublime and beautiful, concludes his account of the paflion thus : The variety of the pallions is great, and *' worthy, in every branch of that variety, of " the mod diligent inveftigation. The more '' accurately we fearch into the human mind, " the flronger traces we every where find of *' his wifdom who made it. If a difcourfe on *' the ufe of the parts of the body may be con- *' fidered as a hymn to the Creator ; the ufe ** of the paflions, which are the organs of the *' mind, cannot be barren of praife to him, " nor unprodudive to ourfelves of that noble *' and uncommon union of fcience and admi- " ration, which a contemplation of the works " of infinite Wifdom alone can afford to a ra- *' tional mind ; whilft referring to him whate-

'* ver

XVI PREFACE.

•' ver we find of right, or good, or fair, m " ourfelves, difcovering his ftrength and wif- *' dom even in our own weaknefs and imper- *' feftion, honouring them where we difcover " them clearly, and adoring their profundity " where we are lofl in our fearch, we may be *' inquifitive without impertinence, and eleva- " ted without pride ; we may be admitted, if *' I may dare to fay fo, into the counfels of the *' Almighty, by a confideration of his works. " This elevation of the mind ought to be the " principal end of all our ftudies, which, if " they do not in fome meafure effed, they are ^' of very little fcrvice to us."

ESSAYS

ESSAYS

ON THE

INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

ESSAY L PRELIMINARY,

C H A P. I.

Explication of Words.

THERE is no greater impediment to thee H A P, advancement of knowledge than the am- I. biguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find feels and parties in mod branches of fcience; and difputes, which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an iffue.

Sophiftry has been more eflFe6:ually excluded from mathematics and natural philofophy than from other fciences. In mathematics it had no place from the beginning: Mathematicians hav- ing had the wifdom to define accurately the terms they ufc, and to lay down, as axioms, the firfl principles on which their reafoning is grounded. Accordingly we find no parties among mathe- maticians, and hardly any difputes.

Vol. I. B In

ESSAY I.

p. In natural philofophy, there was no lefs fophi- flry, no lefs difpute and uncertainty, than in other Iciences, until about a century and a half ago, this fcience began to be built upon the foun- dation of clear definitions and felf-evident axi- oms. Since that time, the fcience, as if watered with the dew of Heaven, hath grown apace; difputes have ceafed, truth hath prevailed, and the fcience hath received greater increafe in two centuries than in two thoufand years before.

It were to be wifhed, that this method, which hath been fo fuccefsful in thofe branches of fci- ence, were attempted in others: For definitions and axioms are the foundations of all fcience. But that definitions may not be fought, where no definition can be given, nor logical definiti- ons be attempted, where the fubject does not admit of them, it may be proper to lay down fome general principles concerning definition, for the fake of thofe who are lefs converfant in this branch of logic.

When one undertakes to explain any art or fcience, he will have occafion to ufe many words that are common to all who ufe the fame lan- guage, and fome that are peculiar to that art or fcience. Words of the lall kind arc called terms of the art, and ought to be diflinclly explained, that their meaning may be underftood.

A definition is nothing clfe but an explication of the meaning of a word, by words whofe meaning is already known. Hence it is evident, that every word cannot be defined ; for the dc- finiiion mufl confilt of words; and there could bo no definition, if there were not words pre- vioufly underilood without definition. Common words, therefore, ought to be ufcd in their com- mon acceptation; and, when they have diflferent

acceptation^

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 3

acceptations in common language, thefe, whenCH AP. it is neceflary, ought to be diflinguiflied. But^ *• they require no definition. It is fufficieiit to de- ' fine words that are uncommon, or that are ufed in an uncommon meaning.

It may farther be obferved, that there are many words, which, though they may need ex- plication, cannot bs logically defined. A logi- cal definition, that is, a ftrid and proper defi- nition, muft exprefs the kind of the thing de- fined, and the fpecific difference, by which the fpecies defined, is diftinguiilied from every other fpecies belonging to that kind. It is natural to the mind of man to clafs things under various kinds, and again to fubdivide every kind into its various fpecies. A fpecies may often be fub- divided into fubordinate fpecies, and then it is confidered as a kind.

From what has been faid of logical definition, it is evident, that no word can be logically de- fined which does not denote a fpecies; becaufe fuch things only can have a fpecific difference ; and a fpecific difference is elTential to a logical definition. On this account there can be no logical definition of individual things, fuch as London or Paris. Individuals are diftinguifhed either by proper names, or by accidental cir- cumftances of time or place ; but they have no fpecific difference; and therefore, though they may be known by proper names, or may be de- fcribed by circumftances or relations, they can- not be defined. It is no lefs evident, that the moft general words cannot be logically defined, becaufe there is not a more general term, of which they are a fpecies.

Nay, wc cannot define every fpecies of things,

becaufe it happens fometimes that we have not

B 2 words

4 E S S A Y I.

CHAP, words to exprefs the fpecific difference. Thus a ^- fcarlct colour is, no doubt, a fpccies of colour; but how fhall we exprefs the fpecific difference by which fcarlet is diftinguifhed from green or blue? The difference of them is immediately perceived by the eye ; but we have not words to exprefs it. Thefc things we are taught by logic.

Without having recourfe to the principles of logic, we may eafily be fatisfieJ that words can- no<" be defined, which fignify things perfectly fimple, and void of all compofition. This ob- fervation, I think, was firft made by Des Car- tes, and afterwards more fully illuftrated by Locke. And however obvious it appears to be, many inftances may be given of* great philofo- phers who have perplexed and darkened the fub- je£ls they have treated, by not knowing, or not attending to it.

When men attempt to define things which cannot be defined, their definitions will always be either obfcure or falfe. It was one of the ca- pital defeds of Aristotle's philofophy, that he pretended to define the fimplefl things, which neither can be, nor need to be defined; fuch as time and motion. Among modern philofophers, I know none that has abufed definition fo much as Caroi-us Wolfius, the famous German philofopher, who, in a work on the human mind, called Pfychologia E?npirica, confiding of many hundred propofitions, fortified by de- monftrations, with a proportional accompany- ment of definitions, corollaries, and fcholia has given fo many definitions of things, which cannot be defined, and fo many demonftrations of things ftlf-evldent, that the greatelt part of the work confiils of tautology, and ringing changes upon words.

There

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 5

There is no fubjed in which there is more CHAP, frequent occafion to ufe words that cannot be ^• logically defined, than in treating of the powers and operations of the mind. The fimpleil ope- rations of our minds muft all be expreifed by- words of this kind. No man can explain by a logical definition what it is to think, to appre- hend, to beHeve, to will, to defire. Every man who underftands the language has fome notion •, of the meaning of thofe words ; and every man, who is capable of reflection, may, by attending to the operations of his own mind, which are fignified by them, form a clear and.diftinft no- tion of them; but they cannot be logically defined.

Since therefore it is often impoffible to define words which we muft ufe on this fubjed, w^ muft as much as poiTible ufe common words, in their common acceptation, pointing out their various fenfes where they are ambiguous; and when we are obliged to ufe words lefs common, we muft endeavour to explain them as well as we can, without affeding to give logical defini- tions, when the nature of the thing does not allow it.

The following obfervations on the meaning of certain words are intended to fupply, as far as we can, the want of definitions, by preventing ambiguity or obfcurity in the ufe of them.

I . By the mind of a man, we undcrftand that in him which thinks, remembers, reafons, wills. The eflence both of body and of mind is un- known to us. We know certain properties of the firit, and certain operations of the laft, and by thefe only we can define or defcribe them.

We define body to be that which is extended, folid, moveable, divifible. In like manner, we

define

6 E S S A Y I.

CHA P. define mind to be that which thinks. We are '• conlcious that we think, and that we have a va- riety of thoughts of diflerent kinds ; fuch as feeing, hearing, remembering, deHberating, refoJving, loving, hating, and many other kinds of thought, all which we are taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle ; and cliis principle of thought we call the mind or foul of a man.

2. By the operations of the mind, we under- fland every mode of thinking of which we are confcious.

It deferves our notice, that the various modes of thinking have always, and in all languages, as far as we know, been called by the name of Operations of the mind, or by names of the fame import. To body we afcribe various pro- perties, but not operations, properly fo called; it is extended, divifible, moveable, inert; it continues in any ilate in which it is put; everyr change of its Hate is the eifed of fome forcer imprcffed upon it, and is exa(Stly proportional to the force impreflcd, and in the precife di- rection of that force. Thefe are the general properties of matter, and thefe are not opera- tions; on the contrary, they all imply its being a dead inadlve thing, which moves only as it is moved, and adls only by being a^ted upon.

But the mind is from its very nature a living and active* being. Every thing we know of it implies life and aftive energy; and the reafon why all its modes of thinking are called its ope- rations, is, that in all, or in moll of them, it is not merely paflive as body is, but is really and properly aftive.

In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have

been

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 7

been exprefled by words of active rignification,C HAP. fuch as feeing, hearing, reafoning, willing, and ^__A_^ the like. It feems therefore to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is adive in its various ways of thinking; and for this rea- fon they are called its operations, and are ex- preiTed by aclive verbs.

It may be made a\ue(lion, What regard is to be paid to this natural judgment? may it not be a vulgar error? Philofophers who think fo, have, no doubt, a right to be heard. But until it is proved that the mind is not adive in think- ing, but merely paffive, the common language with regard to its operations ought to be ufed, and ought not to give place to a phrafeology in- vented by Philofophers, which imphes its being merely paffive.

3. The words power and faculty^ which are often ufed in fpeaking of the mind, need little explication. Every operation fuppofes a power in the being that operates, for to fuppofe any thing to operate, which has no power to ope- rate, is manifellly abfurd. But, on the other hand, there is no abfurdity in fuppofmg a being \

to have power to operate, when it does not ope- rate. Thus I may have power to walk, when I fit ; or to fpeak, when I am filent. Every operation therefore implies power; but the power does not imply the operation.

The faculties of the mind, and its powers^ are often ufed as fynohimous expreffions. But as moft fynonimes have fome minute diftind;ion that deferves notice, I apprehend that the word faculty is mod properly applied to thofe powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the conftitution of the mind. There are other powers which are ac- quired

8 ESSAY I.

C H A P. quired by ufe, excrcife or fludy, which arc not

, _ _ called faculties, but habits. There muft be

fomething in the conflitution of the mind ncccf-

fary to our being able to acquire habits, and this

is commonly called capacity.

a. We frequently meet with a diflinftion in writers upon this fubject, between things /"« the mind, and things external to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Every thing is faid to be iii the mind, of which the mind is the fubjc^. It is felf-evident, that there are fonie things which cannot txifl without a fubjccl to which they belong, and of which they are attributes. Thus colour mud: be in fomelhing coloured; figure in fomething figured; thought can only be in fomething that thinks; wifdom and vir- tue cannot exift but in fome being that is wife and virtuous. When therefore we fpeak of things in the mind, we underfland by this, things of which the mind is the fubjed. Ex- cepting the mind itfelf, and things in the mind, all other things are faid to be external. It ought therefore to be remembered, that this diilincli- on between things in the mind, and things ex- ternal, is not meant to fignify tlie place of the thin;js we fpeak of, but their fubjett.

There is a figurative fenfe in which things are faid to be in the mind, which it is fufllcicnt barely to mention. We fay fuch a thing was not in my mind, meaning no more than that I had not the leaft thought of it. By a figure, •we put the thing for the thought of it. In this fenfe external things, arc in the mind as often as they are the objeds of our thought.

5. Thinking h a very general word, which includes all the operations of our minds, and is fo well undcrflood as to need no definition.

To

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 9

To perceive, to remember, to be confcious, andC HAP. to conceive or iniagi.'e, are words common to Phi- ^• lofophers, and to the vulgar. They fignify dif- ferent operations of the mind, which are diftin- guiflied in all languages, and by all men that think. I (hall endeavour to ufe them in their mofl common and proper acceptation, and I think they are hardly capable oi ilricl definition. But as fome Philofophers, in treating of the mind, have taken the liberty to ufe them very improperly, fo as to corrupt the Englifli lan- guage, and to confound things, which the com- mon underflanding of mankind hath always led them to diflinguilh, I Ihall make fome ob- fervations on the meaning of them, that may prevent ambiguity or confufion in the ufe of them.

6. Firji, We are never faid to perceive things, of the exiftence of which we have not a full convidion. I may conceive or imagine a moun- tain of gold, or a winged horfej but no man fays that he perceives fuch a creature of imagi- nation. Thus perception is diflinguiflied from conception or imagination. Secondly, Perception is applied only to external objefts, not to thofe that are in the mind itfelf. When I am pained, I do not fay that I perceive pain, but that I feel it, or that I am confcious of it. Thus percep- tion is diftinguiihed from confcioufnefs. 'Tbirdh, The immediate object of perception mull be fomething prefent, and not what is pad. We may remember what is paft, but do not perceive it. I may fay, I perceive fuch a perfon has had the fmall-pox; but this phrafe is figurative, al- though the figure is fo familiar that it is not ob- ferved. The meaning of it is, that I perceive the pits in his face, which are certain figns of

his

lo E S S A Y 1.

C II A P. his having had the fmall-pox. We fay we per-

^- ceive the thing fignificd, when \vc only perceive

~''~^' the fign. But when the word perception is ufed

pioperly, and without any figure, it is never

applied to things pad. And thus it is diftin-

guifhed from remembrance.

In a word, perception is mofl properly appli- ed to the evidence which we have of external objects by our fenfes. But as this is a very clear and cogent kind of evidence, the word is often appUed by analogy to the evidence of reafon or of teflimony, when it is clear and cogent. The perception of external objects by our fenfes, is . an operation of the mind of a pecuUar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has fo in all languages. And, in Englifh, I know no word more proper to exprefs this ad: of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, fmelling, tailing, and touching or feeling, are words that exprefs the operations proper to each fcnfe ; perceiving exprelfes that which is common to them all.

The obfervations made on this word would have been unneceflary, if it had not been fo much abufed in philofophicnl writings upon the mind; for, in other writings, it has no obfcurity. Although this abufe is not chargea^ ble on Mr. Hume only, yet I think he has car- ried it to the highefl pitch. The firft fentence ot his Treatife of human nature runs thus : " All the perceptions of the human mind refolve " themfclves into two diflind: heads, which " I fhall call imprellions and ideas." lie adds a little after, that, under the name of imprefli- ons, he comprehends all our fcnfations, pallions, and emotions. Here we learn, that our pallions and emotions are perceptions. I believe, no Englifh writer before him ever gave the name

of

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. ii

of a perception to any pallion or emotion. CHAP. When a man is angry, we mufl fay that he has ^• the perception of anger. When he is in love, ^^^'""^'''^^ that he has the perception of love. He fpeaks often of the perceptions of memory, and of the perceptions of imagination ; and he might as well fpeak of the hearing of fight, or of the fmelling of touch : For, furely, hearing is not more different from fight, or fmelling from touch, than perceiving is from remembering or imagining.

7. Confdoufnefs is a word ufed by Philofo- phers, to fignify that immediate knowledge which we have of our prefent thoughts and purpofes, and, in general, of all the prefent operations of our minds. Whence we may obferve, that confcioufnefs is only of things pre- fent. To apply confcioufnefs to things pad, which fometimes is done in popular difcourfe, is to confound confcioufnefs with memory ; and all fuch confufion of words ought to be avoided in philofophical difcourfe. It is like- wife to be obferved, that confcioufnefs is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to fay I am confcious of the table which is before me. I perceive it, I fee it, but do not fay I am confcious of it. As that confcioufnefs by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as thefe different powers have diff- erent names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a Philofopher ought carefully to preferve this diftinclion, and never to confound things fo different in their nature.

8. Conceiving, imagining, and apprehending, are commonly ufed as fynonymous in our lan- guage,

12 E S S A Y I.

CHAP, guage, and fignify the fame thing which the Lo- gicians call liniple apprehenfion. This is an operation of the mind dift'crent from all thofe wc have mentioned. Whatever we perceive, what- ever we remember, whatever we are confcious of, we have a lull pcrluafion or conviction of its cxidence. But we may conceive or imagine what has no exillence, and what wc firmly be- lieve to have no exiflence. What never had an exiflence cannot be remembered ; what has no exillence at prefent cannot be the object of per- ception or of confcioufnefs ; but what never had, nor has any exiflence, may be conceived. Every man knows that it is as eafy to conceive a winged horfe or a centaur, as it is to conceive a horfe or a man. Let it be obferved therefore, that to co?iceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in the proper fenfe, fignily an aft of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all. It is an aft of the mind by which nothing is affirm- ed or denied, and which therefore can neither be true nor falfe.

But there is another and a very different mean- ing of thofe words, fo common and fo well au- thorifed in language, that it cannot ieafily be avoided ; andonthat account we ought to be the more on our guard, that we be not milled by the ambiguity. Politenefs and good-breeding lead men, on mod occafions, to exprefs their opini- ons with modeflv, efpccially when they differ from others whom they ought to refpeft. There- fore, when wc would exprefs our opinion modeil- ly, inllcad of faying, " This is my opinion," or, ' this is my judgment," which has the air of dogmaticalnefs, we fay, *' I conceive it to be thus, I imagine or apprehend it to be thus ;" which is underftood as a modeft declaration of our judgment. In like manner, when any thing

is

EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 13

is faid which we take to be impoflible, we fay,C HAP, *' We cannot conceive it," meaning, that we cannot believe it.

Thus we fee that the words conceive,